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I. INTRODUCTION
The international community is increasingly being forced to rec-
ognize that the state of the environment is a global concern. 1 Unfor-
tunately, the nature of the problem cannot be addressed unilaterally
as it does not relate exclusively to any individual state.2 Concurrent
with this growing public environmental awareness is recognition of
the interrelationship between trade liberalization and the environ-
ment. 3 In 1999, the preexisting idea that the desire to protect health
and the environment sometimes comes into conflict with the stated
goals of international trade entered the spotlight.4 The growing di-
vide between free traders and environmentalists was evidenced by
the convergence of thousands of protestors in Seattle for the gather-
ing of the World Trade Organization's Third Ministerial Confer-
ence. 5 This protest signaled a new round in a conflict that grew ex-
ponentially since the creation of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in 1995. Too much of the world, the WTO is an organiza-
tion that has exceeded its mandate; it not only sets the rules for in-
ternational trade, but it also establishes the environmental protection
standards for its member governments.
6
* J.D. 2008, Fordham University School of Law; Staff Member of the Envi-
ronmental Law Review, 2008.
1. See Tania Voon, Sizing Up the WTO: Trade-Environment Conflict and the
Kyoto Protocol, 10 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 71 (2000).
2. See id. at 72.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id. (discussing the "growing disquiet over the unresolved conflict be-
tween trade and the environment").
6. Doaa Abdel Motaal, Trade and the Environment in the World Trade Or-
ganization: Dispelling Misconceptions, 8 REv. OF EUR. COMTY. & INT'L ENVTL. L.
(R.E.C.I.E.L.) 330 (1999).
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This note will attempt to examine the at times conflicting interests
of the WTO and environmental advocates, specifically the structure
and policies of the WTO as they relate to environmental protection.
Part II provides the historical background and sets the stage for the
current debate; it includes the formation of the WTO and the organi-
zation's reaction to the harsh criticism it has endured at times. Part
III discusses the official position of the WTO as it relates to envi-
ronmental issues and juxtaposes its positions against some of the
Appellate Body's decisions in this regard. Part V offers some more
notable suggestions for reconciling the conflict between WTO stan-
dards and environmental protection concerns.
II. HISTORY OF THE DEBATE BETWEEN FREE TRADE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT
The origins of the trade and environment debate date as far back as
1972. 7 At the time, environmental protection concerns were just
coming into the forefront of domestic and international policy con-
siderations.8 The recognition of a need for an international forum in
which to hear environmental management concerns led to the 1972
Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment. 9 In preparation
for this conference, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) members created the Working Group on Environmental
Measures and International Trade (EMIT).' 0 Although EMIT did
not conduct its first meeting until twenty years later, its first confer-
ence was conducted right before the 1992 United Nations Confer-
ence on Environment and Development (UNCED), held in Rio de
Janeiro, (also known as the Rio Earth Summit).l' This was no coin-
7. See Julio Garcia Burgues & Mikel Insausti Muguruza, Trade and the Envi-
ronment in the WTO: The European Community's Participation in the Committee
on Trade and Environment, 6 REV. OF EUR. COMTY. & INT'L ENVTL. L.
(R.E.C.I.E.L.) 163 (1997).
8. See Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization Under Challenge:
Democracy and the Law and Politics of the WTO's Treatment of Trade and Envi-
ronment Matters, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 17 (2001).
9. See Katie A. Lane, Comment, Protectionism or Environmental Activism?
The WTO as a Means of Reconciling the Conflict Between Global Free Trade and
the Environment, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 103, 105 (2001).
10. See Shaffer, supra note 8, at 17.
11. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14,
1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc
A/CONF. 151/26, 31 ILM 874 (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
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cidence, the EMIT group was convened at the request of members of
the Euro ean Free Trade Association (EFTA) in anticipation of
UNCED.
During the interim period between these two conferences impor-
tant developments took place in several environmental forums. In
1983 the United Nations convened the World Commission on Envi-
ronment and Development to address the growing concern "about
the accelerating deterioration of the human environment and natural
resources and the consequences of that deterioration for economic
and social development. '  The Commission's report, entitled "Our
Common Future" (also known as the Brundtland Report), coined the
term "sustainable development." 14 It identified poverty as one of the
most important causes of environmental degradation and hypothe-
sized that greater economic growth through increased international
trade would act to reverse this trend. 
15
The Rio Earth Summit focused attention on the role of interna-
tional trade in combating poverty and protection of the environ-
ment. 6 Agenda 21, the measure adopted at the conference, empha-
sizes the importance of international trade in promoting the concept
of "sustainable development."' 7 During the latter part of the Uru-
guay Round of negotiations, as a result of the renewed interest in the
relationship between trade and the environment, the Preamble to the
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO was created. It refer-
enced the importance of working towards sustained development.
1 8
Members recognized that:
[T]heir relations in the field of trade and economic endeavor
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living ...
12. WTO Secretariat, Trade and Environment at the WTO 4 (Apr. 2004),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/envir-e/envir-wto2004_e.pdf [hereinafter
2004 Report].
13. World Commission on Environment and Development, G.A. Res. 42/187,
at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/42/187 (Dec. 11, 1987).
14. U.N Environment Program Governing Council, Report of the World
Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, 27, U.N.
Doc. A/42/427/Annex (Aug. 4, 1987) (prepared by Gro Brundtland) [hereinafter
Brundtland Report].
15. See id. 8.
16. Early Years: Emerging Environment Debate in GATT/WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/envire/histle.htm (last visited Mar. 28,
2008).
17. See 2004 Report, supra note 12, at 4.
18. Id.
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while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accor-
dance with the objective of sustainable development seeking both to
protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for
doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and con-
cems at different levels of economic development. 
1 9
The Members also adopted a ministerial decision arising out of the
Marrakesh Agreement calling for the establishment of the Commit-
tee on Trade and Environment (CTE). 20 The Committee's mandate
calls for the identification of the relationship between trade measures
and environmental measures in order to promote sustainable devel-
opment. Additionally, the mandate makes it incumbent upon the
CTE to make appropriate recommendations regarding the necessity
of any modifications to the provisions of the multilateral trading sys-
tem.21 Since the CTE has this broad mandate, it is significantly
22
more influential than its predecessor group, the EMIT.
More recently, at the Doha Ministerial Conference (which began in
November 2001), the ministers agreed to launch negotiations on the
relationship between existing WTO rules and specific trade obliga-
tions set out in multilateral environmental agreements (MEA's). 23
These talks will seek to clarify the relationship between trade meas-
ures taken under the environmental agreements and WTO rules.
24
The negotiations are conducted in "special sessions" of the CTE.
During these sessions the Committee acts as the forum whereby the
environmental and developmental aspects of international trade are
25debated. The CTE "regular" is charged with examining the effects
of environmental measures on market access, intellectual property
agreement and biodiversity and labeling for environmental pur-
poses.
26
Progressive reinforcement of environmental policies at the national
and international levels and the concerns these policies addressed
spurred the increased interest in the relationship between trade and
the environment. 27 A chief concern was the possible effect that en-
19. Id. at 4-5.
20. Id. at 5.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. The Doha Declaration Explained, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/
ddae/dohaexplained e.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
24. Id.
25. See 2004 Report, supra note 12, at 5.
26. See id.
27. Burgues & Muguruza, supra note 7.
[VOL. XIX
2009] INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 199
vironmental measures might have on trade and competitiveness.28
Importantly, following some GATT panel decisions, a widespread
perception began to emerge among environmental advocates. This
important perception was that the multilateral trading system was not
sufficiently sympathetic to environmental concerns.
III. WTO RULES: ARE THEY A CAUSE FOR CONCERN?
A. The Position of the WTO
To further elucidate this point one must assess how the WTO deals
with the trade related aspects of environmental policies. This calls
for an examination of various agreements entered into by WTO
members as well as some of the decisions rendered by the Dispute
Settlement Body. The WTO has categorized trade related environ-
mental concerns thusly: while some take the form of product stan-
dards requiring a certain level of environmental efficiency, 30 others
take the form of outright bans resulting in the foreclosure of the use
of some environmentally harmful goods. 31 Yet, others may exist in
the form of government subsidies for environmentally friendly mer-
chandise or production methods. 
32
Product standards are dealt with primarily through the WTO
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). The TBT Agree-
ment was designed by WTO member governments and acknowl-
edges the right of each individual government to set environmental
protection standards at the level it considers appropriate. 33 More-
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, reprinted in Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TBT Agreement].
31. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A- 11, 55 U.N.T.S 187 [hereinafter GATT]. The first General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade came into effect in 1947, however, as a result of the various negoti-
ating rounds, including the major overhaul in 1994, the agreement exists in its
current form as GATT 1994.
32. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, reprinted in
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter SCM Agreement].
33. TBT Agreement, supra note 36, at Preamble.
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over, the TBT recognizes the protection of human, animal or plant
life, or health and the protection of the environment as legitimate
objectives for member countries to pursue. 34 However, the Agree-
ment attempts to ensure that these standards are neither discrimina-
tory, nor create unnecessary obstacles to international trade." For
example, a country must apply any environmental standard for one
product to all such products, regardless of their source. 36 It must not
relax its standards towards those that are imported from a particular
source, nor towards those that are produced domestically. 37 In addi-
tion, member governments may develop product standards that cre-
ate obstacles to but they must ensure that these obstacles are not
avoidable ones. 38 If an obstacle is avoidable, the least trade restric-
tive measure must be sought.39
WTO rules pertaining to bans are set out in Article XI of the
GATT. For the most part, Article XI forbids the use of quantitative
restrictions and prohibitions by a member country. As a result, any
ban put into place by a WTO member would automatically be incon-
sistent with Article XI. 40  However, prior to the creation of the
WTO, GATT contracting parties recognized the need for a trade
measure that might be inconsistent with the rules of Article XI.
4 1
Thus, the General Exceptions of Article XX were created. These
exceptions allow member nations to implement trade policies with
environmental objectives that are otherwise inconsistent with GATT
42
rules provided certain conditions are met. First, the measure must
fall within one of the listed exceptions specified in Article XX. In
the context of measures addressing environmental concerns, the ap-
plicable exceptions include: 1) the measure is "necessary" for the
protection of the environment (XXb), or 2) "related" to the conserva-
tion of exhaustible natural resources (XXg). Second, the measure
must meet the conditions of Article XX's chapeau; it must be ap-
plied in a way that does not constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable dis-
34. See id.
35. Id. art. 2.2. The Agreement calls for non-discrimination in the preparation,
adoption and application of product specifications and conformity assessment
procedures.
36. Id. arts. 2.1, 5.1.1.
37. Id. art. 2.1.
38. Id. art. 2.2.
39. Id.
40. See GATT, supra note 37, art. XI.
41. 2004 Report, supra note 12, at 50.
42. See GATT, supra note 37, art. XX.
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crimination between countries or act as a disguised restriction on
trade.43 It is important to note that the analysis for an Article XX
exception does not put the necessity of the environmental objective
into question; instead, it questions the necessity of the trade measure
used to achieve the objective.44 For example, if a WTO member
government can prove that a ban implemented falls within Article
XX (b) or (g) and the ban is not applied in a discriminatory manner,
either between countries or in a way that affords protection to do-
mestic industry (chapeau), then it can circumvent Article XI by way
of an Article XX exception.
With respect to subsidization, the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM) is an agreement created by WTO
member governments in order to regulate their use of subsidies for
products manufactured within a given state.45 Under this agreement
certain subsidies were designated "non-actionable," thus generally
removing them from the prohibition. 46 These non-actionable subsi-
dies expired in 2000 pursuant to Article 31 of the SCM Agree-
ment. 47  Previously, however, non-actionable subsidies related to
environmental concerns were permitted when used to promote the
adaptation of existing facilities to new environmental requirements.
Once again, certain conditions had to be met for their application.
4 8
For instance, the subsidy had to be made available to all firms that
incorporated the new equipment, was limited to 20% of the adapta-
tion costs, did not cover the cost of replacing and operating the as-
sisted investment, was directly limited to planned reduction in a
firm's pollution and did not cover any manufacturing cost savings.
4 9
In addition, the subsidy was only a one time non-recurring meas-
ure. 50 The effect of these requirements was that subsidies having an
adverse impact on trade were still allowed under the SCM Agree-
ment so long as they were used for certain environmental purposes.
43. Id.
44. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting As-
bestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001)
[hereinafter EC-Asbestos].
45. SCM Agreement, supra note 38.
46. Id. art. 8 annex IA.
47. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOwSE, THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 269 (3d ed. 2005).
48. SCM Agreement, supra note 38, art. 8.2(c).
49. See TREBILCOCK & HOwSE, supra note 53, at 269.
50. Id.
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As previously mentioned, the WTO is quick to point out that it
does not set the rules for environmental protection or establish any
standards in this regard. 51 It only sets conditions that require envi-
ronmental standards be met when they have an impact on trade.
Though these rules are not designed to undermine the environmental
protection objectives of member governments, their application has
effectively reduced the ability of countries to set their own environ-
mental agenda. 52 The resulting situation is one in which the WTO's
stated position at odds with the practical effects of their policies.
This contradiction is underscored in several panel and Appellate
Body decisions involving U.S. attempts to set its own environmental
policy.
B. WTO v. U.S. Domestic Environmental Regulations
The organs established to resolve disputes among WTO members
are WTO panels and the Appellate Body. Although they are not
bound by precedent in the same manner as domestic courts in the
U.S., previous rulings made by both the panels and the Appellate
Body are likely to be the best indicators for predicting how the WTO
might deal with disputes involving similar environmental matters in
the future. Several American attempts at implementing a policy cen-
tered on "sustainable development," have been thwarted by certain
key rulings. The following cases illustrate the concerns of some en-
vironmental advocates for the future viability of environmental pro-
tection measures.
1. Tuna-Dolphin I
The first of these decisions arose out of a dispute between the U.S.
and Mexico (Tuna-Dolphin 1).53 In 1972, the U.S. enacted legisla-
tion in the form of the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA). 54
The MMPA established a moratorium on the taking of dolphins in
the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean by U.S. fishermen.5 It also pro-
51. See discussion, id. at 5.
52. See Andrew Green, Climate Change, Regulatory Policy and the WTO, 8 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 143 (2005).
53. Panel Report, United States - Restriction on Imports of Tuna, (Sept. 3,
1991), GATT B.I.S.D. (39t" Supp.) at 155 (1993) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin 1].
54. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (2000).
55. Carol J. Miller & Jennifer L. Croston, WTO Scrutiny v. Environmental
Objectives: Assessment of the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act,
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vided 5Protection for whales, seals, polar bears and other sea mam-
mals. The Act regulated the harvesting of yellowfin tuna in hopes
of reducing dolphin mortality incidental to the use of purse-sein fish-
ing nets 57 and provided for a ban on tuna imported from "intermedi-
ary nations.",58 By 1977 the MMPA helped reduce dolphin mortality
related to tuna harvesting from 300,000 dolphin deaths per year to a
little over 25,000. 59 As the statute applied solely to U.S. vessels, in
an attempt to avoid the domestic restrictions, several American fish-
ermen engaged in the practice of sailing under foreign flags. 60 Con-
gress responded by amending the MMPA in 1984 to require that for-
eign imports of tuna be harvested under comparable or equivalent
standards as those employed by U.S. vessels. 61 If these standards
were not met, the Secretary of Commerce was empowered to issue
an embargo on the importation of the environmentally unfriendly
products. 62 With this amendment, the import of tuna was essentially
prohibited unless U.S. authorities made a determination that the tuna
was caught using measures comparable to those employed by the
United States.
63
The restrictions imposed by the MMPA were challenged b Mex-
ico under Articles I, III, IX, XI and XIII of the GATT 1947. Spe-
cifically, Mexico challenged the provision in the MMPA that prohib-
ited the importation into the U.S. of yellowfin tuna caught using
methods that resulted in collateral injury to dolphins. The WTO
panel concluded that the import restrictions were not internal regula-
tions in accordance with Article III, were inconsistent with Article
XI and were not saved by the exceptions of Article XX. In this case,
the Panel's decision was not adopted because under the GATT 1974,
in order to accept a decision prior to its adoption a consensus was
required. The U.S. and Mexico settled their differences outside of
the GATT framework. Nonetheless, the most significant portion of
37 AM. Bus. L. J. 73, 98 (1999); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (2003) (Moratorium
on taking and importing marine mammals and marine mammal products: Imposi-
tion; exceptions).
56. Miller & Croston, supra note 61, at 97.
57. See 16 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (2003).
58. Id.
59. Miller & Croston, supra note 61, at 97.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 59, 3.1-3.9.
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the report concerned the extraterritorial application of the MMPA.
The panel ruled that the jurisdiction to protect plant or animal life
does not extend outside the territory of the nation imposing the re-
striction. 65 The Panel's approach to extraterritoriality focused on
Article XX (g)'s requirement that the measure be taken in conjunc-
tion with the restrictions on domestic production or consumption.
According to the Panel: "A country can effectively control the pro-
duction or consumption of an exhaustible natural resource only to
the extent that the production or consumption is under its jurisdic-
tion.,
66
Another key portion of the Panel decision involved its "like prod-
uct" analysis. The Panel concluded that differences in a process or
production method were not relevant in determining "likeness., 67
This case resulted in the rule that products produced in an environ-
mentally unfriendly manner cannot be treated differently than prod-
ucts produced in an environmentally friendly manner on the sole
basis of the difference in process or production method. 68 Conse-
quently, the sale of the tuna within U.S. borders did not afford the
right to protect animals in international waters outside of the U.S.
affected by the "process" used to obtain the tuna.
2. Tuna-Dolphin II
A similar complaint was made by the European Economic Com-
munity and the Netherlands in the second Tuna-Dolphin case (Tuna-
Dolphin II).69 This second Panel decision upheld parts of the previ-
ous Panel's findings and rejected others. 70 As in the previous re-
port, the Panel emphasized the importance of promoting sustainable
development but refused to endorse any particular method of envi-
ronmental conservation. 71 The U.S. continued to prohibit imports
that were harvested in violation of the MMPA both from "primary
nations" and "intermediary nations." 72 The complainants argued
65. Id. 5.31.
66. Id.
67. PETER VAN DEN BOsSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION 360 (5th printing 2007).
68. Id. at316.
69. See Panel Report, United States -Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R
(June 16, 1994) (unadopted) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin I1].
70. See id.
71. Id. 5.42.
72. Id. 2.9, 2.12.
[VOL. XIX
2009] INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 205
that the embargo constituted a quantitative restriction in violation of
Article XI. Once again, the U.S. countered with the argument that
the MMPA qualified for an exception under Article XX (b) and (g)
and that the embargo was necessary in order to enforce the restric-
tions on the import of tuna harvested in a manner inconsistent with
U.S. standards.73 According to the U.S., this necessarily included
restrictions on imports from countries that process and export tuna
from sources whose methods did not conform to these standards, the
so-called intermediary nations.
The Panel concluded that the U.S. import restrictions were not jus-
tified as measures necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life
and health under Article XX (b), nor were they "primarily aimed" at
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources as required under
Article XX (g).74 However, the U.S did prevail on one important
point: the Panel deemed efforts to protect dolphins to be a valid pol-
icy aimed at conserving an exhaustible natural resource. 75 In so do-
ing, the Panel noted that the provisions of Article XX (g) were not
limited to resources located in the territory of the country imposing
the restrictions.76 This conclusion was in direct contravention of the
narrower domestic reading of Article XX (g) by the earlier Tuna-
dolphin I panel.
Of particular import was the Panel's st;-gestion that international
environmental treaties were irrelevant to its analysis. The reason
given by the Panel was that these treaties were not concluded by the
contracting parties to the GATT and thus were not applicable to the
interpretation of its provisions. 77 The implication of this position is
that international agreements existing outside of the GATT are mar-
ginalized and thus rendered moot when considered in any trade re-
lated context. 78 Not only is this reasoning untenable in the context
of environmental protection efforts, it is inconsistent with the Vienna
Convention. 79
73. Id. 3.7.
74. Id. 5.27.
75. Id. 5.13.
76. Id. TT 5.16-5.20.
77. See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 53, at 134-35. The authors suggest
that the Panel's interpretation in this regard implies a conception of the GATT as a
"self-contained regime, sealed off from the norms and rules of other international
regimes and the values and constituencies that these reflect." Id.
78. See id
79. See Vienna Convention on the Interpretation of Treaties, art. 31, May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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As was the case in Tuna-Dolphin I, the U.S. was able to veto the
adoption of the Tuna-Dolphin II panel report. Nonetheless, these
two cases became the standard by which to evaluate unilaterally ap-
plied environmental measures. 80 The U.S. was placed in the difficult
position of having to make a choice between following its own statu-
torily enacted mandates or abiding by the obligations imposed upon
81it by the GATT. If the U.S. complied with the decisions of the
GATT panel it would be forced to retreat on conservation policies
that reflected the prevailing public sentiment of its citizenry.
8 2
However, by refusing to follow the Panel's decision, the U.S. would
jeopardize its standing in the international community and risk suf-
fering sanctions from affected nations.83 These rulings underscore
the tension between environmental protection efforts and interna-
tional trade.
3. Reformulated Gasoline
Shortly after the formation of the WTO, Venezuela and Brazil re-
quested the formation of a dispute settlement panel to decide
whether certain regulations of the United States Clean Air Act,
84
more specifically, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's
(EPA's) "Gasoline Rule" 85 were inconsistent with WTO obliga-
tions. 86 These regulations, intended to reduce air pollution in the
U.S., required that gasoline sold in certain U.S. regions with high
levels of air pollution meet a specific pollution standard. 87 This "re-
formulated" gasoline was contrasted with "conventional" gasoline
80. See Miller & Croston, supra note 61, at 107.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2000). The Clean Air Act sets
limits on certain air pollutants, including how much can be in the air anywhere in
the United States. The Environmental Protection Agency is the regulating author-
ity charged with enforcing the Act's provisions. Individual states may have more
stringent air pollution laws, but they may not have less restrictive standards; see
also Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399
(1990).
85. Regulation of Fuel and Fuel Additives-Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, 40 C.F.R. § 80 (2007).
86. See Panel Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conven-
tional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Gasoline Panel Report].
87. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(2)-(3) (2000).
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whose sale was allowed in all other parts of the U.S. 88 At a mini-
mum, the conventional gasoline had to meet the same pollution stan-
dards as gasoline sold in 1990 (baseline standard).8 9 One of the ob-
jectives of the conventional gasoline standard was to prevent blend-
ing of pollutants removed from reformulated gasoline into conven-
tional gasoline. 9° To achieve this objective, a statutory baseline was
established in place of the producer specific 1990 baseline and ap-
plied to producers not in operation in 1990 and to importers. 91 At
the heart of the dispute was the fact that most foreign producers were
not eligible for the less strict individual baselines and instead had to
rely on the harsher statutory baselines.
92
The claim against the U.S. was based on the position that the regu-
lations of the Clean Air Act and the Gasoline Rule were inconsistent
with Article III and not covered by the exceptions of Article XX.
93
The Panel concluded that the regulations treated importers of gaso-
line less favorably than domestic producers and were therefore in-
consistent with the provisions of Article III. 94 Although the Panel
found that the regulation was not excepted by Article XX (b), (d)
and (g), the Appellate Body ruled that the baseline standards fell
within the Article XX (g) exception. 95 However, the base line stan-
dards did not comply with the chapeau of Article XX. The chapeau
prohibits the application of an environmental measure in a way that
constitutes: 1) arbitrary discrimination; 2) unjustifiable discrimina-
tion; or 3) a disguised restriction of international trade.96 The Ap-
pellate Body viewed the fundamental purpose of the introductory
clause as an attempt to avoid abuse or illegitimate use of the Article
XX exceptions. 97 In applying the introductory clause, the Appellate
Body found the U.S. had alternative courses of action available to it
when it implemented the Clean Air Act.98 This meant that the Ap-
88. See id. § 7545(m)(3)(6).
89. Id § 7545(k)(10)(B).
90. See Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 92, 2.4.
91. See 40 C.F.R. § 80.
92. See Gasoline Panel Report supra note 92 3.7.
93. Id 3.1.
94. Id. 6.10. This issue was not considered by the Appellate Body; the
United States did not appeal this portion of the Panel's ruling.
95. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, 35 I.L.M. 603, 633 (May 20, 1996).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 629.
98. Id.
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pellate Body found the measures to be related to the conservation of
an exhaustible natural resource (clean air), that they were made in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consump-
tion, but that they were an unjustifiable discrimination and a dis-
guised restriction on international trade. 99 This conclusion was
based on the fact that domestic producers had a choice to either es-
tablish their own 1990 baselines or rely on the statutory baseline.
Contrary to domestic producers, foreign producers did not have the
option of establishing facility specific baselines. 100 The Appellate
Body suggested alternative courses of action could have included an
imposition of statutory baselines for all gasoline producers or the
availability of individual baselines for all foreign and domestic pro-
ducers.101
Finally, the Appellate Body concluded that U.S. and foreign pro-
ducers could have sought cooperative arrangements to reach the
same result. 1°2 This raises the issue of "multilateral environmental
agreements" and their relationship to the provisions of the multilat-
eral trading system. The Appellate Body appears to endorse the
widely held recognition that using multilateral solutions to trans-
boundary environmental problems is preferable to unilateral solu-
tions. 103 It has not, however, taken the opportunity to directly con-
front the potential conflicts inherent in these types of agreements.
4. Shrimp-Turtle I
The most recent case involving U.S. attempts to implement envi-
ronmental protection measures that directly effecting trade arose
when India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand challenged certain pro-
visions of the U.S. Endangered Species Act. 1°4 In 1989, Congress
amended the Endangered Species Act with Section 609, to afford
protection to sea turtles on an international basis. 105
99. Id. at 633.
100. Id. at 609-10.
101. Id. at 629.
102. Id. at631.
103. See 2004 Report, supra note 12, at 35.
104. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter
Shrimp-Turtle I AB Report]; see also Panel Report, United States-Import Prohibi-
tion of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS59/R (May 15, 1998) [here-
inafter Shrimp-Turtle I Panel Report].
105. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1537 (2000).
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Prior to its amendment, the Act only extended protection to various
species of sea turtles within U.S waters.10 6 In circumstances similar
to those in the Tuna-Dolphin case, sea turtle mortality was directly
related to commercial shrimp trawling activity.' 0 7 Specifically, the
use of nets in to harvest shrimp resulted in the incidental death of sea
turtles at a rate significant enough to make them subject to the pro-
tection of the Endangered Species Act.10 8  Section 609 required
shrimp trawlers to use "turtle excluder devices" (TED's) in their
shrimp nets when fishing in areas likely to be turtle habitats. 109 The
statute further restricted the importation of shrimp and shrimp prod-
ucts to countries with comparable regulations in place or to those
that could demonstrate that their fishing practices did not pose a
threat to turtles. Countries could also comply through a certification
process. 110 In practice, exporting countries had to demonstrate the
use of TED's in order to be certified under this law. 11'
The certification requirement was immediately challenged under
Articles I, III and XI of the GATT. The Panel established to decide
the issue concluded that the certification requirement violated Article
XI (1), and was not justified under Article XX. 112 The U.S. did not
argue, nor did the Panel consider the import restriction as an overall
regulatory measure enforced at the border." 3 Under this type of
scheme, the applicable provision of WTO law is Article III's Na-
tional Treatment obligation. As the Appellate Body would decide
sometime later, the key distinction is whether a border measure is
supported by an internal regulation. 114  The Panel ruled that the
measures imposed by the United States were outside the ambit of
Article XX and were precluded by the chapeau of Article XX as a
threat to the integrity of the trading system. '5
106. Id. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
107. See George Cavros, The Hidden Cost of Free Trade: The Impact of United
States World Trade Obligations on United States Environmental Law Sovereignty,
9 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP L. 563, 568 (2003).
108. See id.
109. See 16 U.S.C. § 1537.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Shrimp-Turtle I Panel Report, supra note 110, 7.11, 7.12.
113. TREBILCOCK & HowSE, supra note 53, at 529.
114. See generally EC-Asbestos, supra note 50.
115. Shrimp- Turtle I Panel Report, supra note 110, 7.51.
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On review, the Appellate Body reversed the sequence of analysis
undertaken by the Panel."16 According to the Appellate Body, the
more sound approach is to first determine whether the measure falls
under the exceptions listed under Article XX (a)-(j). If it does, the
next step is to examine whether the measure conforms to the cha-
peau's requirements. The Appellate Body concluded that the excep-
tions under Article XX exist in order to justify otherwise inconsis-
tent trade measures as long as the policies of those measures are rec-
ognized as legitimate. 117 For this reason, the Appellate Body pro-
ceeded to analyze Section 609 under Article XX (S). Upon recog-
nizing that sea turtles were an endangered species, 18 the conclusion
that they were an exhaustible natural resource followed easily." 
9
Thus, the first prong of the analysis was satisfied. Next, the Appel-
late Body determined that the measure was "related to" the conserva-
tion of an exhaustible natural resource. 120 The policy was a justifi-
able means to the end of protecting sea turtles and therefore satisfied
the second prong of Article XX (g). After finding the measure to
have been applied "in conjunction with" restrictions on domestic
production or consumption, the Appellate Body proceeded to the
final step of the analysis: the chapeau of Article XX. 2 '
Using the chapeau's second tier analysis, the Appellate Body con-
cluded that while the measure was provisionally justified under Arti-
cle XX (g), it did not meet the conditions set out in the chapeau and
therefore was not exempt. Notwithstanding the fact that a multilat-
eral environmental agreement was in place, 122 the Appellate Body
found the U.S. was guilty of unjustifiable discrimination because of
116. Shrimp-Turtle JAB Report, supra note 110, 9 117-23.
117. Id. 121.
118. Id. 132.
119. Id. 134. The Appellate Body pointed out that "One lesson that modem
biological sciences teach us is that living species, though in principle, capable of
reproduction and, in that sense, 'renewable', are in certain circumstances indeed
susceptible of depletion, exhaustion and extinction, frequently because of human
activities." Id. 128.
120. Id. 142.
121. Id. 145.
122. The United States and all of the complaining parties in this case were and
still are Contracting Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, CITES (Mar. 3, 1973). The Agreement's
aim is to ensure that international trade in specimens of wild animals and plants
does not threaten their survival. In fact, the Appellate Body adopted this multilat-
eral environmental agreement as an interpretational tool to conclude that sea tur-
tles were in fact an endangered species.
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its failure to conduct bilateral or multilateral negotiations with the
affected countries in its attempt to reach a cooperative agreement. 1
23
The Appellate Body noted that the U.S. did negotiate with some
countries to produce the Inter-American Convention for the Protec-
tion and Conservation of Sea Turtles but not with other countries. 124
The result of the U.S.'s failure in this regard was a finding of unjus-
tifiable discrimination.
Some observers take this part of the Appellate Body's ruling to
impart a stand-alone duty to negotiate as a precondition to employ-
ing an environmental trade measure. 25 However, this interpretation
does not comport with the specific wording of the Appellate Body's
decision. The Appellate Body never asserted that the chapeau of
Article XX imposed a "sui generis" obligation to negotiate.
12 6
Rather, it requires a member to negotiate in good faith with affected
parties to the extent that it has already done so with other parties af-
fected by the trade measure.'1 27 Supporting this interpretation is the
Appellate Body's focus on the ordinary meaning of Article XX's
text, specifically its chapeau. 128 There is nothing in the text of Arti-
cle XX or its chapeau that can be read to impose a duty to negotiate
in the absence of discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail. 129 Although the Appellate Body relied on the
Rio Declaration and other sources of international environmental law
to hold that global environmental concerns should be dealt with co-
operatively and not unilaterally, it did not incorporate into the cha-
peau a duty to negotiate. 130 Instead it used international environ-
123. The Appellate Body relied on Section 609's requirement that negotiations
be conducted in an effort to come to a cooperative agreement with regard to sea
turtle protection. See discussion, supra, at 17.
124. Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea
Turtles, Dec. 1, 1996, 34 I.L.M. 1244 (1998).
125. See John H. Knox, The Judicial Resolution of Conflicts Between Trade and
the Environment, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 41 (2004).
126. Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A
New Legal Baseline for The Trade and Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 491, 507 (2002).
127. Id. at 508.
128. See Shrimp-Turtle JAB Report, supra note 110, 150.
129. See Howard F. Chang, Environmental Trade Measures, The Shrimp-Turtle
Rulings, and The Ordinary Meaning of The Text of The GATT, 8 CHAP. L. REv. 25
47 (2005).
130. Howse, supra note 132, at 508.
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mental law as a baseline to assess whether the U.S. measure was
unjustifiable. 131
In perhaps the most significant portion of the decision, the Appel-
late Body reversed the Panel decision on the issue of whether trade
measures directed at other States' environmental policies was consis-
tent with Article XX (g).132 Consequently, these measures are no
longer per se inconsistent with the objectives of the multilateral trad-
ing system. 133 The Appellate Body was careful not to uncondition-
ally endorse the use of extra-jurisdictional measures in that it re-
quired "a sufficient nexus between the migratory and endangered
marine populations involved and the United States for the purposes
of Article XX (g).,1 34
In another significant departure from the prior decisions, the Ap-
pellate Body determined that unilateral trade measures were not a
priori excluded from the protection of Article XX.135 According to
the judges, such a reading would render most if not all of the Article
XX provisions "inutile." 1
36
In rejecting the approach of the Panel decisions in both Tuna-
Dolphin cases, the Appellate body emphasized the importance of the
chapeau of Article XX in ensuring environmental measures are not
applied without regard for the differences among countries. Further
consideration must also be given to the manner in which a measure
is applied. Should the application be found rigid and inflexible, the
discrimination may constitute "arbitrary discrimination" within the
meaning of the chapeau of Article XX. 137
Interestingly, the Appellate Body gave weight to international en-
vironmental agreements signed after the GATT 1947 was negotiated.
This practice, in contrast to the Tuna/Dolphin Panels, should give
some comfort to environmental advocates regarding the develop-
ment of the reasoning practices of the Appellate Body.
131. Id.
132. See Shrimp-Turtle I AB Report, supra note 110, 121; see also
TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 53, at 531-32.
133. See TREBILCOCK &HOWSE, supra note 53, at 531.
134. Shrimp-Turtle lAB Report, supra note 110, 133.
135. Id. 121.
136. Id.
137. Id. 177.
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5. Shrimp Turtle II
At the conclusion of the first round of rulings on the Shrimp-Turtle
I dispute, the Dispute Settlement Body made certain recommenda-
tions on measures necessary to enable the U.S. to come into compli-
ance with GATT rules. 138 The U.S failed to change its applicable
law and choose instead to change the manner in which it applied the
law. Specifically, it developed criteria for the certification of export-
ing countries aimed at ensuring the protection of sea turtles by re-
quiring measures "comparable in effect" to those of the United
States. 39
A second challenge was brought by a number of shrimp exporting
countries as to the consistency of this modification with WTO
rules. 140 The Appellate Body in Shrimp-Turtle II held the new rules
were consistent with Article XX, concluding that the revised meas-
ure was sufficiently flexible to meet the standards of the chapeau.1
4 1
It reasoned that the test of "comparable effectiveness" was suffi-
ciently flexible to take into account special circumstances in the ex-
porting country, while providing the necessary assurance to the
country applying the environmental measure. 142
In determining the rules were consistent with Article XX it consid-
ered the obligation to pursue negotiations before applying unilateral
measures and the level of flexibility required for the measure to ac-
cord with the chapeau of Article XX. On the first issue it held that
serious efforts to negotiate in good faith are sufficient, but that there
is no obligation to conclude an agreement. 143 With its decision, the
Appellate Body clarified any misconception of a duty to negotiate by
concluding that the chapeau simply amounted to a requirement of a
138. Meinhard Doelle, Climate Change and the WTO: Opportunities to Moti-
vate State Action on Climate Change Through the World Trade Organization, 13
R.E.C.I.E.L. 85, 91 (2004); see also Appellate Body Report, United States-Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of
the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 22, 2001) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle
II AB Report]; Panel Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia,
WT/DS58/RW (June 15, 2001) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle II Panel Report].
139. See Doelle, supra note 144, at 91.
140. Id.
141. Shrimp-Turtle II AB Report, supra note 144, at 145.
142. Id. 144-48.
143. Id. 115-34.
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"comparable negotiating effort. ' 144 Similarly, in a more recent case
involving the United States and Aruba, the Appellate Body found
that there was no duty to "consult" or "negotiate" with respect to
measures taken by the U.S. to prevent certain gambling and betting
services from being supplied by Aruban service providers.' 45 Al-
though the case was decided under the General Agreement on Trade
and Services ("GATS"), the Appellate Body concluded that the gen-
eral exceptions of Article XX were set out in the same manner as
those under the GATS. 146 Accordingly, the Appellate Body found
the Panels' requirement of consultations with a view to a negotiated
settlement to be an inappropriate alternative for the Panel to have
considered. 147 With respect to the flexibility of the new rules, the
Appellate Body concluded that the test of "comparable effective-
ness" was sufficiently flexible to take into account special circum-
stances in the exporting country while also providing the necessary
assurance to the country applying the environmental measure. 148
An interesting side note in the Shrimp-Turtle disputes is the fact
that in a case brought by Earth Island Institute, before the Panel was
even requested to evaluate Shrimp-Turtle I, the United States Court
of International Trade ruled that the provisions of the Endangered
Species Act, which covered only the Caribbean/Western Atlantic
region, must be extended worldwide. 149 The court issued an order
requiring the Secretary of Commerce to ban the importation of
shrimp that were not harvested with fishing methods "comparable"
to U.S. standards.' 50 As a result of the Panel ruling in Shrimp-Turtle
I, Congress modified the guidelines in 1998. Following the Appel-
late Body decision in Shrimp-Turtle I, the United States Court of
International Trade ruled the 1998 revised guidelines permitting the
importation of shrimp caught with TED's from non-certified nations
violated U.S. law.' 5 This intra-judicial clash raises an interesting
question as to what extent the multilateral trading system may be
144. TREBILCOCK & HowSE, supra note 53, at 536.
145. Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7,
2005).
146. Id. 291.
147. Id. 317.
148. Id. 146.
149. See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. 559 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1995).
150. Miller & Croston, supra note 61, at 92.
151. See Earth Island Inst. v. Daley, 48 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1999).
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affected by a U.S. court, or conversely, to what extent U.S. legisla-
tion may be affected by declarations made by international tribunals.
6. Domestic Emissions Trading
The implementation of international and domestic emissions trad-
ing systems are widely accepted as significant weapons in the reduc-
tion of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the most economically
efficient manner possible. 152 In December 1997, the parties to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) agreed to the text of the Kyoto Protocol. 153 Kyoto is the
first international agreement with legally binding commitments on
the reduction of GHG emissions. 15 With its ratification, most of the
developed world has pledged to meet modest reduction targets for
the period of 2008-2012. 155 However, the two largest per capita
emitters, the U.S. and Australia, have opted, up to now, not to join
this effort to address climate change. 15  The reasons given by the
U.S. for refusing to initiate the ratification process were the fear of
injury to its economy and the extension of voluntary compliance to
developing countries. 157
Although the United States has thus far declined to ratify the
Kyoto Protocol, it would be incorrect to assume that the U.S. has
chosen not to deal with the issue of climate change and, in particular,
the effect of greenhouse gas emissions. 15  In many respects, the
U.S. has acted as a pioneer in the use of market-based policy instru-
ments in the environmental arena. 159 A case in point is the Ameri-
can foray into domestic emissions trading. While the practice of
domestic emissions trading does not directly implicate the WTO and
the multilateral trading system, U.S. efforts in this regard illustrate
152. See Brian Evans, Principles of Kyoto and Emissions Trading Systems: A
Primer for Energy Lawyers, 42 ALTA. L. REv. 167 (2004-2005).
153. Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change,
UNFCCCOR, 3d Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 (Dec.
10, 1997) available at http://unfccc.int/essential-background/kyotoprotocol/
items/1678.php [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
154. Meinhard Doelle, From Kyoto to Marrakesh; A Long Walk through the
Desert: Mirage or Oasis?, 25 DALHOUsIE L. J. 113, 118 (2002).
155. Id.
156. See id. at 120.
157. Id.
158. See Evans, supra note 158, at 169.
159. See discussion, infra pp. 26-27.
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the government's resolve in reconciling an aggressive environmental
protection agenda with its obligations under the WTO.
Before elaborating on these efforts, a brief description of emissions
trading is in order. Emissions trading refers to the process by which
parties can buy or sell permits to emit regulated substances. 60 Es-
sentially, the benefit that accrues from entitlement to an allowance or
permit becomes a commodity that can be traded among market par-
ticipants. 161 Emissions trading significantly reduces the cost of con-
trolling GHG's because it is based on the economic principle that if
the relative cost of performing an activity differs among actors, there
are potential gains to be made from trade. 162 There are a myriad of
ways an emissions trading system can operate; the one fundamental
approach that will be addressed in this paper is the cap and trade sys-
tem.
A cap and trade system is created when a regulatory body sets a
cap or limit on the absolute amount of emissions permitted from a
source or group of sources. 63 Usually, the cap is designed to reduce
the amount of emissions by setting maximum emissions at a lower
level than historically allowed. For example, the Kyoto Protocol
based the limits it imposed on levels from 1990.164 Designated
groups of emitters are then authorized to emit a certain proportion of
the total amount allowed. 16 5 This policy may be practiced on a re-
gional, national, or international level. The Kyoto Protocol is the
standard by which emissions trading is practiced on an international
scale. Emitters who successfully reduce their omissions below their
allocated level may sell their unused permits to others who have ex-
ceeded their allocated allowance. Likewise, participants emitting
beyond their allocated allowance and in excess of any additional
permits purchased from others will be severely penalized. 166
Emissions trading is not a new concept. For example, in 1982 the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) introduced a
new maximum lead content for leaded gasoline. Trading was intro-
duced as part of the EPA's program to reduce the maximum lead
160. Evans, supra note 158, at 178.
161. Id.
162. Seeid.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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content for leaded gasoline.' 67 Participants could create lead rights
capable of being sold to other market participants during the same
quarter the rights were created. 168 In addition, the EPA permitted
these credits to be banked and used at a later date.' 69 The lead trad-
ing program is credited with reducing the maximum lead content of
gasoline much more rapidly than would have otherwise occurred. 1
70
Amendments to the Clean Air Act exemplify more recent efforts
by the U.S. to promote domestic emissions trading.171 This legisla-
tion created a comprehensive market-based program for the control
of sulphur dioxide (S02) emissions from coal fired electric power
plants. Also known as the Acid Rain Program, this program, is de-
signed to achieve a significant reduction in S02 emissions from
electric utilities between 1995 and 2010.172 The Clean Air Act iden-
tifies the sources subject to the legislation along with their allowance
allocation. Initially, allowances were issued free of charge and were
based on actual emissions from 1985, subject to certain adjust-
ments. 173 The Acid Rain Program allowance market has been active
since the early 1990s. As of 2007, the average price paid at the an-
nual S02 auction was $444.39 per tonne. 174 This program has suc-
cessfully in reduced S02 emissions from power plants in an eco-
nomically efficient manner. 
175
At a regional level, the South Coast Air Quality Management Dis-
trict (SCAQMD) established the Regional Clean Air Initiatives Mar-
ket (RECLAIM). 176  This program is intended to reduce emissions
167. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives; Banking of Lead Rights, 50 Fed.
Reg. 13116 (Apr. 2, 1985) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 80).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Evans, supra note 158, at 180.
171. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(7) (2000); see also Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399, 2495 (1990).
172. See Evans, supra note 158, at 181. Under the Acid Rain Program, affected
utility units are allocated allowances based on their historic fuel consumption and
a specific emissions rate. Each allowance permits a unit to emit 1 ton of SO 2 dur-
ing or after a specified year. For each ton of SO 2 emitted in a given year, one
allowance is retired, in that it can no longer be used.
173. Id. at 182.
174. 2007 EPA Allowance Auction Results, available at
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/trading/2007/07summary.html (last visited Mar.
28, 2008).
175. Evans, supra note 158, at 182.
176. Regional Clean Air Initiatives Market, 40 C.F.R. § 70 (1993), available at
http://www.aqmd.gov/reclaim/reclaim.html [hereinafter RECLAIM].
218 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LA W REVIEW
of S02 and N02 in the Los Angeles basin via capping emissions and
allocating allowances to emitters of S02 and N02. The program
works by identifying facilities to receive an annual emissions alloca-
tion and an annual rate of reduction in emissions. 177 The allowances
were initially issued free of charge to participants based on prior
production levels.' 78 Each year credits are assigned to the facilities
and may be bought or sold for use within that year. 179 Facilities
must hold credits equal to their actual emissions and they can sell
excess credits to firms that cannot or choose not to meet their lim-
its. "0 By 2003, this program reduced emissions in N02 by seventy
percent and S02 by sixty percent. 181
In assessing any emissions trading policy, whether it is domestic or
international in scope, its comportment with WTO rules must be
considered. If U.S. federal climate policy were to take the form of a
cap and trade system, questions on its ability to impose a border tax
adjustment under this system would be raised. 182 Under Article 111:2
of the GATT, a border tax adjustment can be imposed on an im-
ported product equal to an "internal tax or other internal charge of
any kind." 183 This is significant in that if a cap and trade measure or
similar measure (carbon tax) were to be applied domestically, the
classification of the allowance as a tax or internal charge would con-
ceivably allow the U.S. to impose a commensurate import levy on
like foreign products. 184 Once again, U.S efforts at implementing
domestic environmental policy would be influenced by how the Ap-
pellate Body ruled in this matter.
177. Evans, supra note 157, at 183.
178. RECLAIM, supra note 182.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. Id.
182. See Joost Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness
Concerns: The Limits and Options of International Trade Law 21, (Nicholas Inst.
for Envtl. Pol'y Solutions, Working Paper No. 07-02, 2007), available at
http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/institute/knowledge-energy.html.
183. GATT, supra note 37, art. III.
184. Id.
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IV. RECONCILING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE WTO, TRADE AND
THE ENVIRONMENT
A. Article XY
During the ongoing conflict between environmental advocates and
proponents of free trade, the decisions from the cases described su-
pra have been relied on to highlight the concerns of environmental-
ists. 185 These concerns center on the fear that the goal of free trade
will lead to the relaxation of U.S. environmental policy. 186 How-
ever, this pessimism does not take into account the existence and
usefulness of Article XX of the GATT. These environmentalists
predicate their outlook on the theory that there is no objective meas-
ure to overcome the requirements of the GATT in implementing en-
vironmental policy. 187  This could not be further from the truth.
Notwithstanding the decisions in the cases already cited, it should be
noted that the Appellate Body has acknowledged, in both EC-
Asbestos and Shrimp Turtle I, the validity of unilateral trade meas-
ures aimed at protecting the environment. 188 While the decisions in
these cases did not declare a per se rule against the environmental
trade measures employed, they went lengths to clarify the standards
required for these measures to be suitable for an Article XX excep-
tion. Thus, the Appellate Body recognized the validity of unilateral
trade measures aimed at protecting the environment, but was also
sensitive to their potential for abuse.
The WTO must engage in this type of nuanced balancing act in or-
der to decide whether a measure is a disguised restriction on free
trade or a legitimate exercise of self-governance.1 89 The WTO has
the unenviable task of advancing the goals of the multilateral trading
system while concomitantly taking care not to dilute legitimate ef-
forts of sovereign states to implement their environmental agenda.
Therefore, rather than condemn dispute settlement bodies for con-
185. See generally Nita Ghei, Evaluating the WTO's Two Step Test for Envi-
ronmental Measures Under Article XX, 18 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 117
(2007).
186. Id.
187. See Brandon L. Bowen, The World Trade Organization and Its Interpreta-
tion of the Article XX Exceptions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
in Light of Recent Developments, 29 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 181, 182 (2000).
188. See EC-Asbestos, supra note 50, 168; see also Shrimp-Turtle II AB Re-
port, supra note 144, 144.
189. See Ghei, supra note 191, at 120.
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clusions they did not reach, perhaps the more apt response is to ex-
amine those conclusions rendered.
Environmental advocates may ground their optimism in the Appel-
late Body's move away from the test of whether the measure in
question is the least trade restrictive manner to achieve the environ-
mental objective. Rather, the focus is now on whether there are
lesser trade restrictive means to obtain the same goal.190 The impli-
cations of this change in position are indicative of the emergence of
the WTO's emphasis on "sustainable development" as a stated goal
for the multilateral trading system. Towards this end, the Appellate
Body has conceded the extraterritorial application of an environ-
mental protection measure to be legitimate under WTO law. 191 Al-
though this jurisdictional interpretation by the Appellate Body is
relevant only to the discussion of Article XX (g), it is at the very
least more generous than the interpretations put forth by the panels
in Tuna-Dolphin I and Tuna-Dolphin II.
Although unilateral measures will be tolerated, the WTO dispute
settlement bodies favor multilateral action over unilateral action.,92
With this in mind, it is easy to understand why U.S. attempts at ap-
plying its environmental protection measures failed. The U.S.' fail-
ure to extend its efforts at multilateral negotiation to all affected par-
ties in Shrimp-Turtle I was at the heart of the Appellate Body's find-
ing that the measure being evaluated was inconsistent with the cha-
peau of Article XX. This again was an immense departure from the
Panel in its earlier decision of this case. The Panel in Shrimp-Turtle
I clearly embraced the view that all unilateral environmental meas-
ures were inconsistent with the chapeau on the basis that they
threaten the multilateral trading system. 193 The Appellate Body re-
treated from this position not just in its analysis of Shrimp-Turtle I,
but also in its subsequent approval of the same measure in Shrimp-
Turtle II.
Once again, in Shrimp-Turtle I, the Appellate Body expanded the
scope of Article XX (g) when it overruled the Panel's view that a
living resource should be distinguished from an "exhaustible natural
resource" within the terms of Article XX (g). Moreover, the Appel-
late Body adopted several multilateral environmental agreements as
190. EC-Asbestos, supra note 50, 172.
191. See Shrimp-Turtle JAB Report, supra note 110, 133.
192. See Shrimp-Turtle II AB Report, supra note 144, 137; see also Shrimp-
Turtle JAB Report, supra note 110, 121.
193. FIONA MACMILLAN, WTO AND THE ENVIRONMENT 103 (2001).
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interpretational tools to arrive at this conclusion. 94 The reliance on
and reference to multilateral environmental agreements in the con-
text of a WTO dispute is especially noteworthy and portend a new
approach to the resolution of these types of disputes.' 
95
The overall conclusion from the case law to date appears to be that
measures that address environmental protection efforts will be ac-
ceptable under WTO law if those measures treat like products alike.
If they do not, the different treatment will have to be justified under
Article XX (b) or (g). The measures most likely to succeed under
these provisions will be those with clear environmental objectives
that leave much flexibility to meet those objectives. Measures ap-
plied without first consulting or deliberating with the countries af-
fected by the measures are also less likely to be saved by Article XX,
unless there is no less restrictive way of achieving the Article XX (b)
or (g) objective.
B. Eco-Labeling
Part of the complaint against the U.S. in the Tuna-Dolphin I case
has yet to be addressed in this note. The complaint concerns a label-
ing scheme established by certain provisions of the Dolphin Protec-
tion Consumer Information Act (DPCIA).196 In response to the vol-
untary actions of some American companies to implement a "Dol-
phin-Safe" tuna label on their products, Congress enacted the
DPCIA in 1990.197 This statute established the requirements for
labeling products as "Dolphin-Safe." Companies marketing tuna
sold in or exported from the U.S. abided by the requirements on a
voluntary basis. Once again, the use of purse seine fishing nets was
discouraged and vessels in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean could
not intentionally set these nets on dolphins during their voyages.' 
98
The Panel in Tuna-Dolphin I found this labeling scheme to be con-
sistent with the MFN obligation of Article . 199 The scheme was
consistent because the labeling regulations applied to all countries
that fished in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean and involved no
194. Id. at92.
195. Id.
196. Dolphin Consumer Protection Information Act of 1990, 16 U.S.C. § 1385
(2000).
197. See Miller & Croston, supra note 61, at 99.
198. Id. at 100.
199. See Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 59, 4.02.
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distinction based on the products' origin. 20 As a result, the use of
what is termed "eco-labeling" has essentially been adopted by the
WTO.
20 1
Eco-labeling schemes must comply with all WTO/GATT require-
ments; this includes the TBT Agreement that governs any regulation
or standard. While there are areas of overlap between the GATT and
202TBT Agreement, any potential conflict is governed by the TBT.
While the majority of mandatory labeling measures will fall under
both the GATT and TBT, the same cannot be said of voluntary
measures. Voluntary eco-labeling related to product characteristics
will fall under the TBT Agreement if they are "standards" within
that defined term of the Agreement. This requires the measures to
be set by a recognized body such as a governmental organization. 203
If the standard is set solely by private industry with no government
involvement, it may not fall within the TBT definition of a "stan-
dard".20 4 Mandatory standards, on the other hand, will fall within
the term "technical regulation," and thus be subject to the require-
ments of the TBT.2 °5 Moreover, should the labeling scheme be
found not "related" to the process and production method, this too
would likely preclude its applicability to the TBT.20 6 The TBT
Agreement additionally emphasizes the use of international stan-
dards as a basis for technical regulations. 207  Article 2.5 of the
Agreement creates a rebuttable presumption that a measure, "in ac-
cordance with relevant international standards," does not create an
unnecessary obstacle to trade.
2 0 8
The acceptance of the U.S. eco-labeling scheme with respect to
dolphin-safe tuna seemed to be based primarily on the grounds that
the program's requirements were voluntary and not mandatory.20 9
The validity of an eco-labeling scheme with respect to WTO obliga-
200. See id.
201. See 2004 Report, supra note 12, at 17.
202. See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, General Inter-
pretive Note to Annex 1A, 33 I.L.M. 1144, 1154 (1994).
203. See TBT Agreement, supra note 36, art. 1.2, Annex 1(2).
204. Green, supra note 58, at 163.
205. See TBT Agreement, supra note 36, art. 1.2, Annex 1(1).
206. See discussion infra pp. 33-38.
207. Green, supra note 58, at 180; see also TBT Agreement, supra note 36, art.
2.4.
208. See TBT Agreement, supra note 36, art. 2.5; see also Green, supra note
58, at 180.
209. See MACMILLAN, supra note 199, at 114.
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tions would seem to hinge on whether or not it fits into the voluntary
versus involuntary category. In addition, these two groups are gen-
erally the consequence of whether the labeling scheme is negative or
positive in nature.210 Mandatory schemes require producers or sell-
ers to identify qualities that consumers may perceive as negative and
would prefer to avoid. 11 Positive labeling, on the other hand, al-
lows producers or sellers to identify characteristics that might be
deemed desirable by consumers.21 2 There is a dearth of case law in
this regard. However, on the basis of the Panel decision in Tuna-
Dolphin I, it would appear that voluntary (positive) labeling schemes
stand the best chance of surviving a WTO challenge. 21 3 This does
not mean that mandatory (negative) eco-label requirements would
not be permissible under WTO rules. On the contrary, if these re-
quirements are applied in a non-discriminatory manner and adhere to
both the MFN and National Treatment obligations, they would likely
be found consistent with both of these provisions.21 4
The position of the WTO on eco-labeling has evolved from the
original decision in Tuna-Dolphin I. WTO member generally agree
that "voluntary, participatory, market based and transparent envi-
ronmental labeling schemes are economically efficient instruments
to inform consumers about environmentally friendly products. 21 5
Furthermore, WTO members recognize that eco-labeling schemes
216tend to restrict trade less than other measures.
The latest U.S. effort to implement an eco-labeling measure in-
217
volves the "Energy Star" efficiency program. Energy Star is a
voluntary performance based labeling scheme covering more than 50
product categories. It is a self-certification measure created with
the objective of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and assisting
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 59.
214. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the
Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 268,
294 (1997).
215. 2004 Report, supra note 12, at 17.
216. World Trade Organization, Environment: Issues, Labeling,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/envire/labellinge.htm (Last visited Mar.
11, 2008).
217. Id.
218. Id.
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consumers in identifying and purchasing products with enhanced
energy efficiency.219
The environmental labeling system is a process by which the mar-
ket itself rewards the environmentally friendly producers. Thus the
labeling system has the potential for achieving environmental objec-
tives while minimizing interference with the multilateral trading sys-
220tem. In light of the general acceptance of these types of measures,
they should prove to be an invaluable resource to environmental ad-
vocates in reconciling the concerns of trade and the environment.
C. Process and Production Methods
A more problematic issue in the eco-labeling debate is the use of
criteria linked to the Process and Production Methods (PPMs) of a
221given product. WTO members agree that countries are within
their rights under WTO law to establish criteria for the manner in
which products are produced, if the method of production leaves a
"trace" in the final product. 222 Member disagreement lies in whether
a measure is consistent with WTO rules if it is based on "unincorpo-
rated" PPMs. 223 These non-product related PPMs leave no trace of
224the production method in the final product. As a result, many de-
veloping countries contend that any discrimination between products
based on non-product related PPMs, such as some eco-labels, is in-
consistent with WTO law. 225 Those PPMs that are directly related to
the characteristics of the product concerned, for example, pesticides
used on crops or hormones used on cattle in the production of meat,
are regulated by two separate codes. 226 The Agreement on the Ap-
plication of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and the TBT
Agreement govern the application of such measures 227
219. Id.
220. See Rich, supra note 35, at 21.
221. See 2004 Report, supra note 12, at 17.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See Schoenbaum, supra note 220, at 288.
227. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 33 L.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter SPS
Agreement]; TBT Agreement, supra note 36.
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The SPS Agreement governs additives, contaminants, toxins and
disease carrying organisms in consumable products, or damage
caused by the entry, establishment or spread of pests.228 The TBT
Agreement covers all technical requirements, voluntary standards
and the procedures to ensure that these are met, except when they are
SPS measures as defined by the SPS Agreement.229
In Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement, a technical regulation is de-
fined as "a document that lays down product and characteristics or
their related processes and production methods., 230  The accepted
interpretation of this clause is that this excludes non-product related
PPMs. 2 1  The SPS Agreement includes, in its covered measures,
those that apply to "process and production., 232 Yet, because SPS
applies to measures seeking to protect life or health within the terri-
tory of the importing country, non-product related PPMs imposed on
imported goods would seem to be excluded by this limitation.233
These Agreements effectively serve to limit a State's ability to adopt
different treatments for separate products with the same physical
characteristics based on how the products were produced or har-
vested.234
Inherent in the provisions of the SPS Agreement is the question of
the precautionary principle and its relevance in the interpretation of
the Agreement. This is an important question especially in light of
its existence in the Rio Declaration, which provides:
"In order to protect the environment, the precautionary
approach shall be widely applied by States according to
their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or ir-
reversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation.
'
"
235
228. SPS Agreement, supra note 233, art. 1.3 (adopting Annex A).
229. Id. art. 1.4.
230. TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 53, at 526; see also TBT Agreement,
supra note 36, Annex I (emphasis added).
231. TREBILCOCK & HoWSE, supra note 53, at 526.
232. SPS Agreement, supra note 233, Annex A, 1.
233. See Steven Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental "PPM's "in the WTO:
Debunking the Myth of Illegality, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 59, 65 (2002).
234. Schoenbaum, supra note 220, at 288.
235. Rio Declaration, supra note 11.
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Its relevance in international law is underscored by its inclusion in
the Maastricht Treaty.
Although it is included in the Maastricht Treaty, the precautionary
principle is still the subject of some debate. 236 In WTO law, the
principle is implicitly embodied in Article 5.7 of the SPS Agree-
ment, which provides that where scientific evidence is insufficient,
governments may "provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary
measures on the basis of available pertinent information." 237 Even
though the precautionary principle is not explicitly provided for in
WTO legal text, the Appellate Body has spoken on some of the key
aspects of the principle's content in a case involving the European
Community.2
38
Under the SPS Agreement, a member's health measure must be
"based on" a scientific risk assessment. 239  In EC-Hormones, the
Appellate Body understood the phrase "based on" to require a ra-
tional relationship between the measure and the risk assessment.
240
In so doing, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel's reading that a
risk assessment must have actually been taken into account in the
measure's implementation. 241 The decision in this case recognizes
that where scientific evidence is insufficient, Article 5.7 will justify a
measure not based on a risk assessment. 242 The Appellate Body was
careful to note, however, that although the precautionary principle is
embodied in Article 5.7, it cannot be invoked outside of Article 5.7
to override other provisions of the SPS Agreement.243 Instead, the
Appellate Body uses it as a tool to interpret those provisions to
which it does apply.2
44
The Tuna-Dolphin I dispute brought the difficulties involved in ac-
commodating non-product related PPMs to the forefront. The U.S.
ban on the importation of tuna did not concern tuna as a product, but
236. See Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), 123, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter EC-
Hormones].
237. Jan Bohanes, Risk Regulation in WTO Law: A Procedure Based Approach
to the Precautionary Principle, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 323, 335 (2001-
2002) (quoting SPS Agreement, supra, note 233, art 5.7).
238. See generally EC-Hormones, supra note 242.
239. See SPS Agreement, supra note 233, arts. 2.2, 5.1.
240. See EC-Hormones, supra note 242, 193.
241. TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 53, at 210.
242. See EC-Hormones, supra note 242, 124.
243. Id. 125; see also Bohanes, supra note 243, at 336.
244. See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 53, at 210.
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rather dealt with the way in which tuna was caught (purse sein fish-
ing nets which caused the incidental deaths of dolphins). The
Panel's like product analysis in both Tuna-Dolphin I and Tuna-
Dolphin II, concluded that distinctions based on factors other than
the physical characteristics of aproduct did not satisfy Article III:4's
National Treatment obligation.2 45
Although a different approach has been taken in other panel deci-
sions, the "trade policy elite has simply accepted the notion of a
sharp divergence between measures on products and PPMs as if such
a distinction had been written into the GATT all along and not sim-
ply invented in the Tuna-Dolphin case. 246 Since that dispute, de-
veloping countries have been sensitive to developed countries' extra-
territorial application of their environmental standards. The relevant
argument is that in their quest to become more developed, different
countries have different optimum levels of pollution they are willing
to sustain and trade off.247 As these levels differ between countries,
one country's standards should not be imposed on another. 248 Stan-
dardizing process and production methods can affect the compara-
tive advantage that a developing country may enjoy.249 Since a dis-
ruption of the cost structure for the production of various goods im-
pacts less developed nations more negatively than it might impact
the U.S., these distinctions are inherently unfair.250
An attendant argument against the use of PPMs in the environ-
mental policies of developed countries stresses the need to preserve
territorial sovereignty. 251 This concern was raised when the U.S.
environmental trade measures, in the cases already discussed, were
found inconsistent with WTO trade agreements. It is said that the
245. Id. at 525.
246. Id. at 526. The authors discuss the unadopted Panel Report (US-Taxes on
Gasoline) which took a contrary approach to that taken in the Tuna-Dolphin cases.
Here, the Panel held that the distinction in question - automobiles that met feder-
ally mandated fuel economy requirements, as opposed to those that did not -
served a legitimate non-protectionist objective, the conservation of fossil fuels.
Thus, for purposes of Article III, imports that did not meet the standard were not
considered 'like' products to those that did. This dichotomy of approaches has not
expanded the ambit of non-product related PPMs.
247. See Duncan Brack, Balancing Trade and the Environment, 71 INT'L AFF.
497 (1995).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Motaal, supra note 6, at 333.
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prevention of discrimination between products on the basis of PPMs
means that choices made within national boundaries are respected.252
Developing countries argue that many current global environmental
problems were created by developed countries, not themselves.
They thus contend it is those developed countries that should bear
the greatest burden in their resolution.
253
Critics of these arguments usually respond that other articles of the
GATT do permit discrimination under certain circumstances.254
Moreover, one nation's territorial sovereignty should not permit that
State to engage in destructive practices that affect those outside of its
borders without some form of remuneration. 255 Although the direct
environmental impact of production methods based in a foreign land
is difficult to assess, there is a fear that the economic consequences
of the trade measure may be more direct. 256 One consequence is that
domestic producers are encumbered by higher costs of compliance
with the regulatory scheme of the importing country. 2 5 7 This raises
the fear that they will be undercut by competition from companies
based in countries with significantly less regulation and lower pro-
duction costs. 258 This has often been referred to as the "race to the
bottom," where manufacturers will be led to those countries where
costs of production are ostensibly lower as a result of more lenient
environmental policies.259
The WTO dispute settlement bodies' positions with respect to non-
product related PPMs makes little sense. Domestic environmental
regulations on PPMs are the norm. Factories are told how much pol-
lution they may emit, lumber companies are told how and where
they may harvest trees and chemical companies are told how they
must treat their waste. Therefore, from an environmental perspec-
tive, it makes sense to also be able to discriminate at the border be-
tween otherwise like goods produced in environmentally different
ways. Admittedly, allowing discrimination based on PPMs would
present some difficulties for the trading system. It might provide
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See, e.g., GATT, supra note 37, art. XX.
255. See Brack, supra note 253, at 507.
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. See id at 507-08.
259. See Schoenbaum, supra note 220, at 293.
[VOL. XIX
2009] INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 229
governments a greater opportunity to protect their domestic indus-
tries unfairly against foreign competition.
Notwithstanding the potential for exploitation, non-product related
PPMs are an important tool in managing one of the true global con-
cerns we face today. They are a reflection of a failed multilateral
response and the efforts to achieve consensus that have taken prece-
dence over fixing our deteriorating environment. While it is easy to
point fingers and characterize PPMs as a form of environmental im-
perialism, at some point discord has to give way to action. This is
not to say that any PPM, product related or not, should not be sub-
jected to scrutiny by the WTO to determine whether it is protection-
ist or not. 260 Rather, the inquiry should be whether the government
of the importing country has a legitimate environmental concern
about the production practices of the exporting country. 261 While
special consideration should be given to those instances where a
non-product related PPM was initiated at the behest of domestic pro-
ducers, this should not be dispositive of protectionist intent.
262
V. CONCLUSION
Over the years, decisions of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
have undergone a protracted but gradual metamorphosis. The early
cases examining the scope of Article XX developed strict interpreta-
tions of the Article's provisions limiting the role for unilateral action
in environmental protection. More recently, however, the Appellate
Body has taken a position more consistent with the global environ-
mental concerns associated with international trade. While this may
be far from the ideal that is currently debated, it does signal a sig-
nificant departure from the early case law involving environmental
trade measures. The Appellate Body has recognized that while uni-
lateral measures are not consistent with the stated goals of the WTO,
they are justifiable when rooted in the purposes of Article XX and
administered even handedly.
263
Recent case law has resulted in a number of other changes with re-
gard to how the WTO examines the environmental trade measures of
its member countries. Diverging from earlier decisions, the Appel-
260. See Chamovitz, supra note 239, at 74.
261. See id.
262. See id.
263. See Bowen, supra note 193, at 201.
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late Body now recognizes the significance of multilateral environ-
mental agreements in its analysis of contested environmental meas-
ures. The proliferation of eco-labeling schemes is another area of
common ground between the concerns of international trade and en-
vironmental protection. And in yet another variation from an earlier
position, the WTO has come to recognize the validity of trade meas-
ures directed at another member's environmental policies.
The decisions effecting these changes reflected a need for the
WTO to give specific recognition to environmental concerns to
which the WTO responded accordingly. Although there is a sizable
consensus that the decisions discussed in this paper were decided
correctly, the WTO adeptly responded to the concerns of its member
nations as well as to the international community at large. This
process of accommodation will require an ongoing effort to respond
to the conflicts that will continue to arise in the trade and environ-
ment arena.
While the jurisprudence of the Dispute Settlement Body has been
the mechanism by which many of these changes have occurred, they
were precipitated by a growing international concern regarding the
impact of economic growth on the world's environment. These con-
cerns were distilled in the WTO report on trade and the environment
which reflects the evolving position of the WTO, and is indicative of
the relative importance it now places on reconciling the conflict be-
tween trade and the environment.
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